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DIVORCE: A TAXING EXPERIENCE
By Charles Edward Falk
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1.01 Introduction
Among the many changes made by the Tax Reform Act ("TRA") of 1984
was an overhauling of the definition and treatment of alimony', and an equally
radical change for certain spousal transfers. The new legislation reflects the
uncertainties and frustrations that resulted from the former law. While the
changes made to the Code are sweeping, the practitioner continues to face a
demanding requirement that clients be thoroughly informed and counseled
about the implications of any settlement or property transfer, and that any
documents be carefully drawn so that the intended tax consequences are
achieved.
' Unless otherwise provided, for purposes of this paper, the term "alimony" includes payments made for
separate maintenance pursuant sec. (71) (a).
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2.01 Alimony
2.02 Reason for Change
The only similarity between the law concerning the taxation of alimony
before the TRA 1984 and the changes made by the Act is the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code") designation for includibility (section 71) and deductibility
(section 215).
The motivation for change is provided in the General Explanation of the Act
prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation:
The Congress believes that the prior law definition of
alimony is not sufficiently objective. Differences in State
laws create differences in Federal tax consequences and
administrative difficulties for the IRS. The Congress
believes that a uniform Federal standard should be set
forth to determine what constitutes alimony for Federal
tax purposes. This will make it easier for the Internal
Revenue Service, the parties to a divorce, and the courts
to apply the rules to the facts in any particular case and
should lead to less litigation. The Act attempts to define
alimony in a way that would conform to general notions of
what type of payments constitute alimony as dis-
tinguished from property settlements and to prevent the
deduction of large, one-time lump-sum property
settlements.2
The change, however, is even more complete than set forth in the above
quote.
2.03 What is Alimony
The Code provides that "gross income includes amounts received as ali-
mony or separate maintenance payments." 3 The term "alimony or separate
maintenance payment" means any payment received by or on behalf of a
spouse, or a former spouse, of the payor under a divorce or separation
instrument that meets all of the following requirements: 4
(a) The payment is in cash.
(b) The payment is not designated as a payment which
is excludible from the gross income of the payee and
nondeductible by the payor.
(c) In the case of spouses legally separated under a
decree of divorce or separate maintenance, the spouses
are not members of the same household at the time the
payment is made.
7 Joint Committee in Taxation, General Explanation, CCH Edition, p. 714.
71(a)
4 Temp. Reg. ("TR") 1.71-IT, Q + A 2. The Treasury promulgated temporary regulations on August 30,
1984. They are in question and answer form.
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(d) The payor has no liability to continue to make any
payment after death of the payee (or to make any payment
as a substitute for such payment) and the divorce or
separation instrument states that there is no such liability.
(e) The payment is not treated as child support.
(f) To the extent that one or more annual payments
exceed $10,000 during any of the 6-post-separation years,
the payor is obligated to make annual payments in each of
the post-separation years.
2.04 A Divorce or Separation Instrument ("DSI")
The Code defines a DSI as:
(A) A decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a
written instrument incident to such a decree. ("DDSM")
(B) A written separation agreement ("WSA"),
or
(C) A decree (not described in subparagraph (A) (re-
quiring a spouse to make payments for the support or
maintenance of the other spouse (71 (b) (2) (C)). 5
2.05 Payments Must be in Cash
A major departure from prior law is that payments will only qualify as
alimony if they are made in cash. 6 Payments of cash to a third party on behalf of
a spouse qualify, if the payments are made pursuant to a DSI. The regulations
provide rent, mortgage, tax or tuition liabilities as examples of direct payments
made to third parties.7 Payments made to maintain property owned by the payor
spouse but used by the payee spouse will qualify.8 Premiums paid by the payor
spouse for term or whole life insurance on the payor's life made under the terms
of a DSI will qualify to the extent the payee spouse owns the policy. 9 A payee
spouse may also make a written request that payments be made directly to a
third party. These payments will qualify if the request states that the parties
intend the payment to be treated as alimony under sec. 71, and must be received
by the payor spouse prior to the filing of the payor spouse's first tax return for
the taxable year in which the payment was made. 10 The regulations give a cash
payment to a charitable organization as an example of this kind of payment."
5 71(b) (2)
6 71(b) (1)7 TR. 2. 71-IT, Q + A 6
s Ibid
9 Ibid
'0 TR. 1.71-IT, Q + A 7
" Ibid
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2.06 Designation of Payment
Payment that would otherwise qualify as alimony, and be deductible by the
payor and includible by the payee can be designated as excludible from gross
income and not deductible. 12 Such designation must be made in the DSI. The
statement must be made in the relevant instrument and a copy must be attached
to the payee's first tax return for each year in which the designation applies. 13
2.07 Members of the Same Household
The new law provides that payment made pursuant to a DDSM will only
qualify as alimony if the parties are not members of the same household at the
time such payment is made. 14 This requirement of living apart does not apply to
payments made pursuant to a WSA or a 71(b) (2) (C) order. 15 A payment will
nonetheless qualify if it is made while one spouse is preparing to depart and
does depart not more than one minute after the date the payment is made. '
6
2.08 Payor Liability to make Payments after Payee's Death
One of the most crucial provisions of the new law is that the payor spouse
must have no liability to make any payments, whether in cash or property, after
the death of the payee spouse, or any payments as a substitute for those
payments, and the DSI must state that there is no such liability. 17 A failure to
make this statement in the agreement will cause the payments not to be treated
as alimony, and will not be deductible by the payor nor excludible by the
payee. 18 The temporary regulations are quite emphatic and specific on this
point: 19
A is to pay B $10,000 in cash each year for a period of
10 years under a divorce or separation instrument which
does not state that the payments will terminate upon the
death of B. None of the payments will qualify as alimony
or separate maintenance payments.
The fact that local law or an oral agreement provides that payments will
terminate is of no consequence. 20 A requirement that substitute payments are to
be made upon the death of the payee spouse will cause all payments (pre-death
and post-death) to fail to qualify. 2 ' The regulations provide that payments will
be considered substitute payments "to the extent that one or more payments are
12 71(b) (1) (B)
13 Ifsuch a designation is intended, counsel should review TR. 1.71-IT, Q + A 8 for the requirements. While
the parties may agree not to include or deduct payments otherwise qualifying, presumably no procedure is
permitted to qualify non-qualifying payments.
14 71(b) (1) (c)
5 T.R. 1.71-IT, Q + A 9
16 Ibid
,7 7 1(b) (1) (D)
'
8 T.R. 1.71-IT, Q + A, 10 and II
' Ibid, Q + A 11, example (1)
20 lbid, Q + A 12
21 lbid, Q + A 13
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to begin to be made, increase in amount, or become accelerated in time as a
result of the death of the payee spouse. "22 The regulations do however, provide
that such a determination will be made on a case by case basis.23 The following
example from the regulations is instructive on this point:
Under the terms of a divorce decree, A is obligated to
make annual alimony payments to B of $30,000, termi-
nating on the earlier of the expiration of 15 years or the
death of B. The divorce decree provides that if B dies
before the expiration of the 15 year period, A will pay B's
estate the difference between the total amount that A
would have paid had B survived, minus the amount
actually paid. For example, if B dies at the end of the 10th
year in which payments are made, A will pay B's estate
$150,000 ($450,000 - $300,000). These facts indicate
that A's liability to make a lump sum payment to B's
estate upon the death of B is a substitute for the full
amount of each of the annual $30,000 payments to B.
Accordingly, none of the annual $30,000 payments to B
will qualify as alimony or separate maintenance pay-
ments. The result would be the same if the lump sum
payable at B's death were discounted by an appropriate
interest factor to account for the prepayment. 24
2.09 Payments Treated as Child Support
As under prior law, payments for child support do not constitute alimony,
and are not includible in the gross income of the recipient and are not deductible
by the payor. 25 Unlike prior law, however, the degree of specificity with which
such payments must be stated is reduced. Under prior law, the standard had
been defined in Commissioner v. Lester,26 where the Supreme Court required
that the agreement "specify or fix" on amount designated as child support. The
new law relaxes this requirement by permitting, as child support, payments
which are reduced on the happening of a contingency. The code specifies two
types of reductions:
(1). On the happening of a contingency specified in the
DSI relating to the child such as the attainment of a
specified age, marrying, dying, leaving school, etc.
(2). At a time which can be clearly associated with a
contingency specified in (1)27
22 Ibid, Q + A 14
23 Ibid
2 Ibid, example (2)
2 71 (c); T.R. 1.71-IT, Q + A 15
366 U.S. 299 (1961)
27 71(c) (2)
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The regulations provide that (2), above, will be applied to two situations:
(1). Where payments are to be reduced no more than 6
months before or after the child attains the age of 18, 21 or
local age of majority;
(2). Where payments are to be reduced on two or more
occasions which occur not more than one year before or
after a different child of the payor spouse attains a certain
age between 18 and 24 inclusive.28
Both of the above are rebuttable presumptions .29 The regulations provide an
interesting example of how (2), above, will be applied:
A and B are divorced on July 1, 1985, when their chil-
dren, C (born July 15, 1970) and D (born September 23,
1972), are 14 and 12, respectively. Under the divorce
decree, A is to make alimony payments to B of $2,000 per
month. Such payments are to be reduced to $1,500 per
month on January 1, 1991 and to $1,000 per month on
January 1, 1995. On January 1, 1991, the date of the first
reduction in payments, C will be 20 years 5 months and 17
days old. On January 1, 1995, the date of the second
reduction in payment, D will be 22 years 3 months and 9
days old. Each of the reductions in payments is to occur
not more than one year before or after a different child of
A attains the age of 21 years and 4 months. (Actually, the
reductions are to occur not more than one year before or
after C and D attain any of the ages 21 years 3 months and
9 days through 21 years 5 months and 17 days.) Accord-
ingly, the reductions will be presumed to clearly be
associated with the happening of a contingency relating to
C and D. Unless this presumption is rebutted, payments
under the divorce decree equal to the sum of the reduc-
tions ($1,000 per month) will be treated as fixed for the
support of the children of A and therefore will not qualify
as alimony or separate maintenance payments.3 °
If a part payment is made, the payment is first applied to child support.31
2.10 Front Loading
The 1984 act added new rules concerning the "front loading" of
payments.32 The purpose of this rule is to deter taxpayers from making large
early payments to obtain large tax breaks.
28T.R. 1.71-IT, Q + A 18
29 Ibid
30 Ibid, example in Q + A 18
31 71(c) (3)32 71(f)
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The first rule provides that any otherwise deductible payment in excess of
$10,000 will not be deductible in excess of $10,000 unless a payment in each of
the six "post separation years" is made. 33 The six post separation years are the
six consecutive calendar years beginning with the first calendar year in which
the payor makes an alimony or separate maintenance payment (except a
payment under 71(b) (2) (C)). 34
The second "front loading" rule is designed to reduce the fluctuation in the
amount of the payments made during the six post separation years. In any of the
six post separation years, if a payment is less than a payment made in a prior
year, the prior year's payment is "recaptured" to the extent that the prior year's
payment exceeds the present year's payment plus $10,000. Any amount
recaptured is included in the income of the payor spouse and is deductible by the
payee spouse.35 Any amount recaptured reduces the prior year's payment for
future calculations. The application of this rule may be illustrated by the
following example:
Payor spouse H makes payments to payee spouse B as follows (payments in
thousands):
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Amount Paid 30 25 20 15 10 5
Potential Recapture 20 15 10 5 0 0
Amount Recaptured
1985 - - - - - -
1986 0 -...
1987 0 0 - . .
1988 5 0 0 - - -
1989 5 5 0 0 - -
1990 5 5 5 0 0 -
Total Recaptured 15 10 5 0 0 0
If H had no obligation to make payments in 1990, the rule requiring a
payment in each of the six post separation years would have been violated, and
only $10,000 (or less) would be permitted as a deduction in each year. For
example, if no payment had been required in 1990, the amount so permitted
would have been:
Payment Amount Allowed
1985 30 10
1986 25 10
1987 20 10
1988 15 10
1989 10 10
13 71(f) (i)
471(f) (4)
35 71(f) (2)
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The code provides for these exceptions to the "recapture rule":
(1.) Payment made pursuant to a 71(b) (2) (C) order,36
(2.) Payments that are subject to a contingency not within
the payor's control;
37
(3.) Any year in which payment cease by reason of the
death or remarriage of the payee spouse. 38
2.11 Effective Date
Generally, the new law applies to a DSI executed after December 31, 1984.
The regulations give the following summary:
Generally, section 71, as amended, is effective with
respect to divorce or separation instruments (as defined in
section 7 1(b) (2)) executed after December 31, 1984. If a
decree of divorce or separate maintenance executed after
December 31, 1984, incorporates or adopts without
change the terms of the alimony or separate maintenance
payments under a divorce or separation instrument ex-
ecuted before January 1, 1985, such decree will be treated
as executed before January 1, 1985. A change in the
amount of alimony or separate maintenance payments or
the time period over which such payments are to continue,
or the addition or deletion of any contingencies or condi-
tions relating to such payments is a change in the terms of
the alimony or separate maintenance payments. For ex-
ample, in November 1984, A and B executed a written
separation agreement. In February, 1985, a decree of
divorce is entered in substitution for the written separation
agreement. The decree of divorce does not change the
terms of the alimony A pays to B. The decree of divorce
will be treated as executed before January 1, 1985 and
hence alimony payments under the decree will be subject
to the rules of section 71 prior to amendment by the Tax
Reform Act of 1984. If the amount or time period of the
alimony or separate maintenance payments are not speci-
fied in the pre-1985 separation agreement or if the decree
of divorce changes the amount or term of such payments,
the decree of divorce will not be treated as executed before
January 1, 1985, and alimony payments under the decree
will be subject to the rules of section 71, as amended by
the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
36 71(f) (5) (b)
37 71(f) (5) (c)
38 71(f) (5) (a)
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Section 71, as amended, also applies to any divorce or
separation instrument executed (or treated as executed)
before January 1, 1985 that has been modified on or after
January 1, 1985, if such modification expressly provides
that section 71, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of
1984, shall apply to the instrument as modified. In this
case, section 7 1, as amended, is effective with respect to
payments made after the date the instrument is
modified.39
3.01 Spousal Transfers
3.02 Reason for Change
One of the most dramatic changes made by the TRA of 1984 was the across
the board exemption from income taxation of transfers between spouses and
certain former spouses. The enactment of new section 1041 of the code
effectively repeals the often cited and potentially disastrous United States v.
Davis.40 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a transfer by a husband to his
wife of appreciated property in satisfaction of her marital rights resulted in the
recognition of gain to the husband. In repealing this holding, the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation stated:
The Congress believes that, in general, it is inap-
propriate to tax transfers between spouses. This policy is
already reflected in the Code rule that exempts marital
gifts from the gift tax, and reflects the fact that a husband
and wife are a single economic unit.
The current rules governing transfers of property be-
tween spouses or former spouses incident to divorce have
not worked well and have led to much controversy and
litigation. Often the rules have proved a trap for the
unwary as, for example, where the parties view property
acquired during marriage (even though held in one
spouse's name) as jointly owned, only to find that the
equal division of the property upon divorce triggers rec-
ognition of gain.
Furthermore, in divorce cases, the government often
gets whipsawed. The transferor will not report any gain on
the transfer, while the recipient spouse, when he or she
sells, is entitled under the Davis rule to compute his or her
gain or loss by reference to a basis equal to the fair market
value of the property at the time received.
The Congress believes that to correct these problems,
39 T.R. 1.71, Q + A 26
- 370 U.S. 65 (1962)
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and make the tax laws as unintrusive as possible with
respect to relations between spouses, the tax laws govern-
ing transfers between spouses and former spouses should
be changed.41
As indicated, Sec. 1041 applies to all spousal transfers, not just those
incident to a divorce.42
3.03 How Transfers are Treated
Section 1041(b) provides that transfers within the scope of 1041 are treated
as gifts, and the transferee's basis is the adjusted basis of the transferor.
3.04 What Transfers Quality
Section 1041(a) applies to transfers to a spouse or to a former spouse, if the
latter is incident to a divorce. Section 1041 is not a elective section, but applies
if its provisions are met. Sham transactions and step transactions which do not
technically fall with its provisions nonetheless qualify in appropriate cir-
cumstances.43 Transfers to a nonresident alien do not qualify."
While a transfer to a spouse is self explanatory, transfers to a former spouse
are a little more complicated. The statute requires that the transfer be "incident
to a divorce." 45 A transfer is deemed to be "incident to a divorce" if either:
(1). The transfer occurs not more than one year after the date on which the
marriage ceases;
46
(2). The transfer is related to the cessation of the marriage.47
A transfer is related to the cessation of the marriage if it is pursuant to a DSI
(as defined in sec. 71), and the transfer occurs not more than 6 years after the
date on which the marriage ceases. 48 This, however, is a rebuttable pre-
sumption, and may be defeated by showing that the transfer was made to effect
the division of property at the time of the cessation of the marriage. 49 The
regulations give as an example where legal or business impediments delayed
the transfer.5°
Transfers of property to a third party may qualify under sec. 1041 under
either of the following situations:
1. Where the transfer is required by the DSI;
4' The committee report indicates that taxpapyers often failed to report the gain from such transfers. The author
once had a client who received a form 1099 from his former spouse. She indicated to her former husband that she
"didn't want him to overlook the $400,000 plus gain!"42 T.R. 1.1041-IT(a), Q + A 2
41 Ibid, Example 3
44Ibid, Q + A 3
41 1041(c); Annulments also qualify under Sec. 1041.
46 1041(c) (1)
47 1041(c) (2)
48 T.R. 1.1041-IT(b), Q + A 7
49 Ibid
"o Ibid
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2. Where the transfer is pursuant to the written request of the other (or
former) spouse;
3. Where the transferor or spouse (or former spouse) receives from the other
spouse a written consent or ratification of the transfer to the third party. 5
3.05 Liabilities and Other Ancillary Issues
The thrust of sec. 1041 is to eliminate the recognition of gain from any
transfer within its scope. In keeping with this spirit, the following should be
considered:
A. No gain is recognized even where the transferor transfers property that is
subject to liabilities that exceed the basis of the property.52
B. If the transferor transfers property that is subject to investment credit
recapture, no recapture will occur. However, if the transferee fails to utilize this
property in a qualifying manner (the property is disposed of or ceases to be sec.
38 property), the unearned credit will be recaptured.53 For example, a husband
transfers to his wife, pursuant to a DSI, an auto used in husband's business, on
which H had received an investment tax credit one year ago. If wife uses the
property for personal purposes, the wife will have to recapture 2/3 of the
husband's prior credit.54
C. The transfer of an installment obligation is not considered a disposition. 55
D. Given the interest that no gain should be recognized on any transfer within
sec. 1041, judicial doctrines such as the assignment of income or tax benefit
rule should not apply. This is also consistent with the exception for installment
obligations discussed above.
E. The TRA of 1984 enlarged the time frame for the application of sec. 2516
as to gift tax consequences to a three year period beginning on the date 1 year
before the agreement,56 and added 2043(b) (2) and 2053(e) to allow certain
transfers to constitute a full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth.57
3.06 Notice and Recordkeeping Requirements
The regulations require that the transferor supply the transferee with records
sufficient to determine the adjusted basis and holding period of the property
transferred, and, if the property is subject to investment credit recapture,
records sufficient to determine the adjusted basis and holding period of the
5i Ibid, Q + A 9
52 Ibid, Q + A 12; The transferee is not permitted to "step up" the basis of the property to the amount of the
liabilities.
53 47(e)
I This example assumes the auto is 3 year property. See T.R. 1.1041-IT(d), Q + A 13
55 453B(g)
I While sec. 1041 exempts the recognition of gain or loss for the income tax purposes, since the transfer is
treated as a gift, the normal gift tax rules apply.
11 Generally, marital rights are not considered "a full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth."
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property transferred, and, if the property is subject to investment credit
recapture, records sufficient to determine the amount and period of any
potential liability."8
3.07 Effective Date
Generally, sec. 1041 applies to transfers after July 18, 1984. 59 However,
sec. 1041 will not apply to transfers made pursuant to instruments entered into
before July 18, 1984, unless both spouses agree. 60 Further, transfers after
December 31, 1983, can qualify if both spouses agree. 6 1 If such elections
apply, they must apply to all transfers.62
-' T.R. 1.1041 -IT(e), Q + A 14
'9 Ibid, Q + A 15
(' Ibid; The regulations give directions how this election should be made. See T.R. 1041-IT(e), Q + A 18
6' Ibid
62 Ibid
